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Abstract:
The ninetiesagricultural reform in China that was aimed at deregulating the agricultural market even-
tually resulted in a huge drop in agricultural production and a high rate of ination in agricultural prices;
this apparently motivated the government to take over the control of agricultural prices in 1998. We ex-
amine how and to what extent this reform a¤ected the productivity and welfare of grain farmers in China
at the regional level. We nd that the price regulation that destroyed the incentive to exert more e¤ort
adversely a¤ected the growth in agricultural productivity but contributed to the growth in farmerswelfare.
Although the price regulations resulted in short term improvement in welfare across all the regions, for the
long run such regulations can result in larger drop in agricultural production because of its negative impact
on incentives to produce more.
JEL Codes: N55, O13, O53, Q12.
Keywords: China, Welfare, TFP, Agriculture, Grain Production.
1Cardi¤ Business School, Aberconway, Colum Drive, CF10 3EU, United Kingdom; Email: selimst@cardi¤.ac.uk.
1 Introduction
During 1978-1997 the government of China introduced a series of agricultural policy reforms which
were mainly aimed at achieving a higher level of aggregate production of major foodgrains. How-
ever, during the nineties China su¤ered signicant declines in grain production. In addition, the
liberalization of markets in the nineties allowed for higher degrees of ination in agricultural prices
which eventually resulted in a less than expected level of real income for farmers. This apparently
motivated the government to take back the control of agricultural prices in 1998 (through the intro-
duction of the grain self-su¢ ciency program). In this paper we examine how the price regulations
introduced in 1998 a¤ected the productivity and welfare of grain farmers in 30 main agricultural
regions of China.
We follow the analytical approach as in Hayami and Ruttan (1985), which McMillan et al.
(1989), Lin (1992) and Zhang and Carter (1997) explore to study foodgrain productivity growth
in China for 1978-84, 1970-87 and 1979-86, respectively. None of these studies consider the most
recent important agricultural reform in China that was introduced in 1998. We examine how the
1998 reform a¤ected the Total Factor Productivity (TFP) of grain production and the welfare level
of farmers at a regional level. In this way our study extends all these important previous studies.
This paper also adds a new dimension to the empirical relevance of the analytical approach of these
works (and others, such as Halbrendt and Gempesaw, 1990 and Che et al., 2001, 2006) by simulating
the e¤ect of regulations on the welfare of farmers and the TFP at the regional level2 .
In economies in transition factor price and product price increase at di¤erent rates with market
reforms. If the net price e¤ect favours farmers, they earn higher income which adds to their utility.
However, earning higher income requires more e¤ort that gives them disutility. In this paper we
examine the net utility e¤ect of the most recent agricultural reform in China. We use panel data of 30
major grain-producing regions of China for the period 1997-2006 in order to estimate a transformed
production function that captures the farmers optimal response to changes in institutions and policy.
We use the results of the econometric estimation in order to simulate the time path of TFP and the
time path of optimal utility levels for each of the 30 regions that we consider.
We nd that while the price regulations of 1998 resulted in an average negative growth in TFP for
almost all regions (except Jiangxi, Jilin, Henan, Liaoning and Tibet), it contributed to the growth
in welfare of farmers for all 30 regions. The average regional growth in welfare during 1997-2006 is
as high as 9:91% (e.g. Beijing), and the average regional growth in TFP during the same period is as
low as  4:07% (e.g. Shanghai). Based on the largest grain producer per hectare scale, most of the
large regions experienced decline in TFP but around 7% growth in welfare. Relatively smaller grain
producing regions such as Xinjiang, Tianjin, Shanghai, Qinghai and Beijing all experienced over
8% growth in welfare. These results suggest that although the stabilization of agricultural prices
2Carter (2003) conducts an investigation of agricultural productivity in China at both the aggregate and farm
levels, but his study does not involve any analysis of welfare e¤ects at the regional level.
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contributed to farmersincome, it destroyed the incentives to increase e¤ort, resulting in a decline
in TFP but also resulting in a positive net impact on farmerswelfare.
2 The Analytical Model
There are j regions which produce grain, and j = 1; 2; :::; N . Farmersutility function is:
u ( j ; "j) =  j   "
1

j (1)
where  2 (0; 1),  j denotes the net income from grain production and "j is the level of e¤ort by
the representative farmer in region j3 . Grain production requires four inputs: e¤ective contribution
of labour ("jNj), land (Lj), machinery power (Mj) and chemical fertilizers (Fj). With 0 2 (0;1)
and i 2 [0; 1] ; i = 1; 2; 3; 4, such that
4P
i=1
i = 1, the technical constant returns to scale (CRTS)
grain production function for region j is:
Qj = 0 ("jNj)
1 (Lj)
2 (Mj)
3 (Fj)
4 (2)
Output per farmer is simply qj = 0"
1
j l
2
j m
3
j f
4
j . Let wij ; i = 1; 2; 3; 4, denote the price of input i.
Farmers choose the least cost combination of inputs, and the total cost function for region j is:
Cj = j (w)Qj (3)
where  > 0 is a constant, and the average real input price is j (w) 
Y
i
wiij . Let 'j  j(w)pj ,
which is the ratio of the observed average input to product prices for region j. The net income per
farmer in j is simply  j = pjqj
 
1  'j

. Farmers choose e¤ort level in order to maximize utility.
The representative farmers utility maximization problem, after substituting qj = 0"
1
j l
2
j m
3
j f
4
j
and  j = pjqj
 
1  'j

in (1), is:
max
"j
u ("j) =
h
pj0"
1
j l
2
j m
3
j f
4
j
 
1  'j
  " 1j i (4)
The optimal value of e¤ort level satises
 
"j
( 1 1) = hpj  1  'j 01l2j m3j f4j i (5)
Notice here that since price regulation changes the way the output price and the input prices are
determined, observing these prices the farmers choose their optimal e¤ort level according to (5).
Substituting for the optimal e¤ort level in (2) we derive the production function that captures
3The marginal utility of income is strictly positive and constant, while the marginal disutility of e¤ort is increasing
in the level of e¤ort. In this model the variable e¤ort includes everything that determines the quality of the farmers
labour as well as the willingness to exert more e¤ort as a result of enhanced incentives to earn more by producing
more.
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farmersoptimal response to changes in market and institutions:
Qj =

(0)
1
1 1

1pj
 
1  'j
	 1
1 1

(Nj)
1(1 )
1 1 (Lj)
2
1 1 (Mj)
3
1 1 (Fj)
4
1 1 (6)
We dene Aj  (0)
1
1 1

1pj
 
1  'j
	 1
1 1 as the total factor productivity (TFP) coe¢ cient
of grain production for region j. Given the anaytical model, any policy reform that alters the prices
of inputs and output has two channels of a¤ecting the welfare level: the enhanced incentives to earn
higher income (which adds to welfare), and the incentive to exert more e¤ort in order to earn higher
income (which reduces welfare). Net improvement in welfare due to a particular policy reform thus
will depend on which of these two e¤ects dominates. Intuitively, if a particular reform brings in a
relatively higher rate of increase in the price of output it will a¤ect both the net income and the
optimal e¤ort level. Unless the net e¤ect is numerically characterized, it is not possible to determine
the net welfare e¤ect of reforms. Price regulation is expected to stabilize agricultural prices, which
in turns will stabilize the income levels of farmers. However, price regulations will in general destroy
farmersincentive to exert more e¤ort, which is why it is likely to result in a decline in productivity
and an increase in the level of farmerswelfare.
We estimate (7) using regional level grain production data. Once we obtain the estimates of the
share coe¢ cients of the inputs, together with
4P
i=1
i = 1 we have 5 equations in 5 unknowns, 1, 2,
3, 4 and . By solving this system we pin down these parameters.
For the simulation of optimal utility we need to simulate rst the optimal e¤ort level, and for
both simulations we need the data for net income per farmer. Simulation of the optimal e¤ort level
also requires a pinned down value for the parameter 0. For this, notice that the TFP in (7) has two
components, (A0)j =
h
(1)
1
1 1 (0)
1
1 1
i
, and (A1)j =

pj
 
1  'j
 1
1 1 ;and Aj = (A0)j (A1)j .
With regional level data on net income per farmer, we simulate a series for (A1)j for each j. We
use the standard Solow residual approach in order to simulate a series for Aj . This in turns enables
us to simulate a series for (A0)j , and deriving a series for the parameter 0 is then straightforward.
We use the simple arithmetic average of this series in order to pin down one value of 0 for all
regions. This, together with the regional level data for net income of farmers enable us to simulate
the optimal utility undex for all regions for the full sample period.
3 Data, Estimation, Simulations and Results
Our main data source is the Statistical Yearbook published by the National Bureau of Statistics,
China (SYB, CBNS)4 . Summary statistics for the panel data (including variable descriptions) are
4This is the primary source for Chinese agricultural data published by the Economic Research Service at the
United States Department of Agriculture (ERS, USDA), http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/China/, and All China Data
at the China Data Center of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, http://chinadataonline.org/. The SYB, CBNS
data that we use are freely available online in http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/ . The SYB,
CBNS reports regional data for 31 regions, but we leave out Hainan because for this region there are many missing
values.
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presented in table 1 (in appendix). For the econometric estimation of (7) we convert the output,
machinery power and fertilizer data in per hectare form. The labour data is taken in the form of
person days per hectare (i.e. calculated by dividing the workers per hectare by three hundred as an
approximate number of working days in one year).
We estimate (7) using di¤erent combinations of xed and random e¤ects, and in table 2 (in
appendix) we report the results from a model that was estimated using period xed e¤ects. For this
model the period xed e¤ects are signicant (based on xed e¤ects redundancy test), and from a pool
of estimated models this particular one is chosen on the basis of standard likelihood ratio test, the
highest R
2
, no misspecication and the lowest AIC (where applicable). In table 3, we summarize the
diagnostic test results. We nd CRTS in grain production (based on a standard wald test). Only the
output elasticity estimate for labour is statistically insignicant. Based on these estimates and the
CRTS assumption in (2), we pin down 1, 2, 3, 4 and , which are 0:0203; 0:8041; 0:0182; 0:1571
and 0:5106, respectively.
Simulation of (A1)j requires more information at the regional level, because of the term pj
 
1  j

.
The SYB, CBNS does not report prices for individual inputs for the regional level, which is why we
use available information and  j = pjqj
 
1  'j

in order to derive a series for the term pj
 
1  j

for each region5 . We collect the information on per capita net income of rural population (in yuan,
which is our proxy for  j) from the peoples livelihood series in the SYB, CBNS. We derive the per
farmer grain output by dividing the aggregate grain output by the number of agricultural workers
for each region j. Together with  j = pjqj
 
1  'j

this gives us a series for the term pj
 
1  j

for each j, and simulating (A1)j is now straightforward. Together with Aj = (A0)j (A1)j we derive a
series of 0, and pin down one value of 0 = 0:512 for all regions. Using these pinned down parameter
values, we simulate the optimal e¤ort for each region j and then simulate the optimal utility for each
region j for the full sample period. We convert both the TFP and the optimal utility into indices
with previous year as the base year. This enables us to examine the changes in TFP and welfare
due to the price regulations introduced in 1998.
In gure 1 (in appendix) we present the simulated paths of the TFP index and the welfare index
for all 30 regions for the full sample period. For all 30 regions the TFP is volatile but the rate
is mostly in the negative margins. There is a clear trend of an increase in welfare for all regions.
Almost all large grain producers, except for Liaoning, Jilin, Henan and Jiangxi, su¤ered negative
average growth in TFP in the range of  0:19% (Yunnan) to  1:94% (Guangdon) for the full sample
period. The smaller regions such as Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Xinjiang su¤ered larger average
decline in TFP, equal to  3:07%,  4:07%,  3:44% and regions  2:21%, respectively. These smaller
regions also experienced the largest average growth in welfare (over 8%), implying that there exists
a clear tradeo¤ between productivity growth and welfare growth which came as a result of the price
regulations. Except for Guangdon, Guangxi, Heilongjiang and Jilin, all large grain producing regions
experienced over 7% average growth in welfare.
5The term pj
 
1  j

is simply the ratio of net income (per farmer) and output (per farmer).
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4 Concluding Remarks
Many important studies which were undertaken before 1998 (e.g. Halbrendt and Gempesaw, 1990,
Harrold, 1992 and Lin, 1992) argue that the pre-nineties agricultural reforms in China performed
their aim of generating rapid economic growth on the basis of e¢ ciency gains. But during the liber-
alized regime of the nineties the country-wide average growth rate of grain production was  1:4%,
accompanied by a 10:07% growth in grain price index and a 3:02% growth in the real net income
of rural households (SYB, CBNS data). Allegedly, these observations motivated the government to
take back the control of agricultural prices in 1998. In this study, we show that following the price
regulations of 1998 farmersof all grain producing regions of China have experienced a growth in
their welfare. Data suggests that during 1998-2005 the average growth rate of grain price index
was 1:42%. In this paper we show how this stabilization of agricultural prices has contributed to
farmersincome vis a vis welfare. We also show that the price regulations has adversely a¤ected the
productivity growth in almost all regions of China that produce grain. If China aims to increase
agricultural production and productivity, future policy reforms should address the issue of relaxing
the price regulations and at the same time creating a sound agricultural market environment such
that any degree of liberalization does not lead to worsening of the growth in farmerswelfare.
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Appendix: Tables & Figures
Table 1: Summary statistics for regional level data (30 regions, 1997-2006)==
Variable Description Mean St. Dev Min Max
Output Total yield of grain (1000 tons) 1589.1 1145.13 58 4582
Labour Agricultural employment (10000 persons) 1061.62 815.67 57.9 3903.7
Machinery Total power of agricultural machinery (10000 kw) 1772.14 1836.16 63.6 9199.33
Land Total area of land sown for grain (10000 Hectares) 3577.66 2436.76 141.3 10027.6
Fertilizer Total quantity of chemical fertilizer (10000 tons) 140.87 113.64 2.5 493.16
Net income per capita net income of rural population (1000 yuan) 2.766 1.371 1.1 9.138
Output per farmer per farmer yield of grain (tons) 1.715 0.932 0.581 6.156
//All data are from SYB, CBNS. Output of grain is the total production of cereal (rice, wheat and corn), beans and
tubers, measured on an annual basis in 10000 tons. The areas (total cultivated land and sown area for grain) are in 1000
hectares, and agricultural employment is in 10000 persons. This agricultural labour force refers to the total labourers who are
directly engaged in farming and receive remuneration payment or earn business income in the farming sector. The machinery
power data is the total power of agricultural machinery (in 10000 kw) used in farming, forestry, animal husbandry, and shery,
including ploughing, irrigation and drainage, harvesting, transport, plant protection and stock breeding. Fertilizer data is
the quantity of chemical fertilizer (in 10000 tons) applied in agriculture during the year, including nitrogenous fertilizer,
phosphate fertilizer, potash fertilizer, and compound fertilizer.
Table 2: Summary of panel estimation results
Cross Period Cov. Constant
d1(1 )
1 1
d2
1 1
d3
1 1
d4
1 1 R
2
section method [p-value] [p-value] [p-value] [p-value] [p-value]
None Fixed White 0.7269 0.0119 0.8160 0.0185 0.2008 0.9671
CS [0.0024] [0.6402] [0.0000] [0.0760] [0.0000]
Table 3: Summary of diagnostic tests
Null Test p Decision
hypothesis statistic value
Redundant xed e¤ects 30.4384 0.0006 Reject Null
Constant Returns to Scale 1.4066 0.1107 Accept Null
All coe¢ cients in (7) are together insignicant 692.56 0.0000 Reject Null
Model correctly specied 0.4399 0.2324 Accept Null
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Figure 1: Simulated Welfare index and Simulated TFP index in 30 grain producing regions of China, 1997-2006. 
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